



MATTERS REQUIRING JUDICIAL NOTICE.
I.
To require that every step in judicial proceedings be forti-
fied by evidence, as that the Court has territorial jurisdiction,
or of the subject-matter, or the like, would not only be a
manifest absurdity, but would divert attention from the real
issues involved, and the trial of a cause might descend into
a useless wrangle over abstractions. That parties should be
permitted, then, to rely securely upon the Court as to certain
facts, is an absolute necessity. It is usual to regard what
may be termed the routine matters of judicial proceedings, as
being settled: yet they are so held as established, simply
because the Court takes judicial notice of them. But there
are other matters, frequently somewhat or even quite collat-
eral to the issues being tried, that may receive recognition
from the Court without being pleaded or proved. These
classes of facts are so diverse and various in character that
the Courts are often called upon, without having the benefit
of any precedent applying thereto, to determine whether or
not they should be thus received.
Perhaps no subject falling within the administration of the
law, so constantly calls for the exercise of a sound discretion
by the Courts, as that of judicial notice. This arises mainly
from the fact that those matters which. the Court will thus
recognize, are, for the most part, only capable of classifica-
tion under a few heads, and thus the generality of their
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description would include facts which unquestionably require
averment and proof. The general ground, or rule, if it may
be so called, which can be applied to all phases of the sub-
ject is, that in receiving this class of facts without averment
or proof, Courts simply act on knowledge of their truth.
But this should not be understood as an assumption by the
judges of any special or technical knowledge of the matter;
they merely recognize the fact in question as being already
sufficiently established. Three classes of facts naturally fol-
low as many divisions of the rule, of which there can be no
question that Courts will take judicial notice: first, matters
of. public law, which all are bound to know; second, matters
so notorious as to be regarded as universally known; and
third, matters peculiarly within the cognizance of the par-
ticular Court: 1 Phil. Ev., § 619.
However clear the rule may be as to primary distinctions,
the real question must at last rest with the Court for solution.
While all Courts agree, for instance, that every public law,
enacted by the proper legislative authority, must receive judi-
cial notice within the same jurisdiction, it still remains for
the Court to say whether or not the particular act be a public
statute; and although a fact may be of undoubted notoriety,
to establish this, might be more difficult than to prove the
fact itself.
The limits, therefore, beyond which Courts may not safely
pass, are regulated more by the soundness of judgment and
sense of justice of the judges, than by any fixed rules that can
be adopted. It follows that in many' instances the admis-
sibility of this class of facts must depend upon the peculiar
circumstances existing in each particular case. Nor is it
essential to its judicial reception that the Court have a com-
plete knowledge of the fact; for no division of opinion exists
that this information may be obtained from any authentic
source. Thus stamped with the seal of absolute verity, this
class of facts may be embraced in instructions to juries,
without interference with their prerogative as triers of fact.
The restrictions surrounding the admission of judicial notice
of such facts as are in their nature official, legislative, politi-
cal, judicial, commercial, historical, geographical, scientific
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and artistic, are usually so manifest as to admit of compara-
tive certainty in their application; but, in addition to these,
notice will be taken of a wide range of matters of uniform
natural occurrence, and' those generally arising in the usual
course of life, the claim for recognition of which consists in
their certainty and notoriety.
While this peculiar power of the Courts will invariably be
exercised with caution in regard to the latter classes of facts,
much care is required that no mistake be made in the truth
of the fact assumed, that the requisite notoriety exists; and
all reasonable doubts upon the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative: Brown v. Piper (1875), 91 U. S. 37.
As already indicated, while this subject has the sanction
of well-settled principles of the law, the questions presented
under it are often incapable of reference to any positive rule
of decision, and the result is that perhaps in no other branch
of jurisprudence do the adjudicated cases exhibit so wide a
range of circumstances, affording, for this reason, the most
practical view of the subject.
II.
As all civilized nations constitute one great family of
sovereign states, they recognize each other's existence and
general public and external relations, including Acts of
State, and their Courts take judicial notice of the national
flags and seals, as the highest emblems of sovereignty:
Griswold v. Pitcairn (1816), 2 Conn. 85 ; The Santissima
Trinidad (1822), 7 Wheat. (20 U. S.) 283. The public
seal of a state, properly affixed to proceedings, either judi-
cial or diplomatic, is taken notice of as a part of the law
of nations and proves itself: Lincoln v. Battelle (1831), 6
Wend. (N. Y.) 475. But where a foreign de facto govern-
ment has not been recognized by the executive power of the
government under which the Court is organized, its seal can-
not be admitted to prove itself: U. S. v. Palmer (1818), 3
Wheat. (16 U. S.) 634 ; City of Berne in Switzerland v. Bank
of England (1804), 9 Ves. Jun. 847; Dolder v. Lord Huntig-
feld (1805), 11 Id. 288.
Foreign judgments are judicially noticed when they are
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authenticated, either by the great seal, by a copy proved to be
a true copy, or by a certificate of an officer authorized by law,
and this certificate is itself properly authenticated: Church
v. .Fubbart (1804); 2 Cranch (6 U. S.1, 187.
The law of nations is of force, not because it has been pre-
scribed by any superior power, but because it has been gen-
erally accepted as a rule of conduct: The Scotia (1871), 14
Wall. (81 U. S.) 170. The law of nations, which is acknowl-
edged generally as binding on all independent states, and as
aftecting the rights of their citizens or subjects, is derived
from three sources: first, from the long and ordinary prac-
tice of nations, which affords evidence of a general custom,
tacitly agreed to be observed until expressly abrogated;
second, the recitals of what is acknowledged to have been
the law or practice of nations, and which will frequently be
found in modern treaties; third, the writings of eminent
authors, who have long, by a concurrence of testimony and
opinion, declared what is the existing international jurispru-
dence: Vattel's Law of Nations (Chitty), § 3, note 1.
Under prize and admiralty jurisdiction, the law of nations
controlling these matters is frequently noticed and applied by
the Courts. The established law upon the subject in Eng-
land is, that the sentence of a foreign Court of competent
jurisdiction, condemning the property upon the ground that
it was not neutral, is so entirely conclusive of the fact de-
cided that it can never be controverted, directly or collate-
rally, in any other Court having concurrent jurisdiction: Bol-
ton v. Gladstone (1804), 5 East, 155; Oddy v. Boville (1802),
2 Id. 478; Lothair v. Henderson (1803), 8 B. & P. 499;
Huqhes v. Cornelius (Trin. Term, 82 Car. 2), 2 Show. 242.
Substantially the same doctrine prevails in the Supreme
Court of the United States: Croudson v. Leonard (1808), 4
Cranch (8 U. S.), 484. In the State of New York a somewhat
different rule obtains, and it is there held that, if it appear
from the proceedings in the prize Court that the condemna-
tion was a breach of the law of nations, it will not be con-
sidered as binding upon the Courts of other countries upon
the question of neutrality, but that, in making this inquiry,
the Courts cannot take judicial notice of the municipal laws
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of the foreign country: Ocean Ins. Co. v. Francis (1828), 2
Wend. (N. Y.) 64. Of course, the seal of a Court of Admi-
ralty proves itself, and when it appears to have been affixed
to a decree by the deputy registrar, it will be received:
Thompson v. Stewart (1819), 8 Conn. 171.
Courts 'will also take judicial notice of and apply the
law merchant as a part of the law of nations: Jewell v. Cen-
ter (1854), 25 Ala. 498. The various customs entering into
and comprising the law merchant, having all repeatedly re-
ceived judicial sanction, are universally recognized as forming
a system of established facts not subject to proof. Thus, the
notary's certificate and seal, when used in this connection, is
noticed the world over; and with equal facility is the almanac
received, as the basis of judicial notice of the time of pre-
sentation and non-payment of a foreign bill of exchange:
Reed v. Wilson (1879), 41 N. J. L. 29; Bank of Columbia
v. Fitzhugh (1827), 1 H. & G. (Md.) 289; Branch v. Burnley
(1797), 1 Call (Va.), 147; Wiggins v. Chicago (1878), 5 Mo.
App. 847 ; Consequa v. Willings (1816), 1 Pet. U. S. C. 0. 225 ;
Munn v. Barch (1860), 25 Ill. 85 ; Goldsmith v. Sawyer (1873),
46 Cal. 209.
The English Courts apply essentially the same principles
to this subject as our own; but they are required to take ju-
dicial cognizance of numerous facts not existing in this coun-
try. Of these are the accession and demise of the sovereign:
Holran v. Burrow (Trin. Term, 1 Anne), 2 Ld. Ray. 791;
s. c. Salk. 658. The correspondence of the year of any
particular reign with the year of our Lord: Henry v.
Cole (Mich. Term, 1 Anne), 2 Ld. Ray. 811 ; s. c. 7 Mod. 103;
Regina v. Pringle (1840), 2 Moo. & R. 276. The preroga-
tives of the Crown and the privileges of the royal palaces;
.Elderton's Case (Trin. Term, 2 Anne), 2 Ld. Ray. 978; s. c.
Salk. 284; Winter v. Miles (Sittings after East., 48 Geo. 3),
1 Camp. 475; Att'y-Gen. v. Donaldson (1842), 10 M. & W.
117. In like manner they take notice of the great and privy
seals, and also of the sign manual: Rex v. Miller (1772), 2
W. B1. 797; s. c. 1 Leach, 74; Rex v. Gully (1773), 1 Id.
98. They also take notice of royal proclamations, as being
acts of state; but not of orders of council: Wells v. Williams
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(Mich. Term, 9 Will. 8), 1 Ld. Ray. 282; s. a. 1 Salk. 46;
Dupays v. Shepherd (Mich. Term, 10 Will. 3), 12 Mod.216;
Rex v. Sutton (1816), 4 M. & S. 532; Att'y-Gen. v. Theak-
stone (1820), 8 Price, 89. Judicial cognizance is also taken of
the commencement of the sessions, prorogations, and dissolu-
tions of Parliament, and of the place where any particular
Parliament sat: Rex v. Wilde (Mich. Term, 22 Car. 2, B. R.),
2 Keb. 686 ; Birt v. .othwell (East. Term, 9 Will. 3), 1 Ld.
Ray. 210, 343. They will also notice the customs, privileges
and proceedings of Parliament, and of each branch of the Leg-
islature: Lake v. King (Hil. Term, 19 & 20 Car. 2), 1 Saund.
181, a; Astley v. Younge (1759), 2 Burr. 811. But they will
not take notice of the journals of either House, as they are
held not to be the records of the Parliament: Rex v. Knollys
(Trin. Term, 6 Will. & Mar.), 1 Ld. Ray. 10, 15.
HI.
The authorities admit of no question that the existence and
tenor of all public statutes of the State, and the time when
they took effect, will be judicially noticed by the Courts hav-
ing their organization or sitting within the same jurisdic-
tion. This recognition rests, indeed, not only upon the fact
of their being a part of the law of the land, which all are
bound to know, but is equally required by the official authen-
tication of a co-ordinate branch of the government: Lane v.
Harris (1854), 16 Ga. 217; State v. Bailey (1861), 16 Ind. 46;
-aeaston v. Cincinnati, etc. B. B. Co. (1861), Id. 275; P'er-
son v. Baird (1849), 2 G. Gr. (Iowa), 235 ; Berliner v. Waterloo
(1861), 14 Wis. 378. It is held still further, that the exist-
ence and time of taking effect of a public Act, cannot be put
in issue, or admitted or denied by the pleadings, but must be
determined by the judges themselves: Att'y-Gen. v. Foote
(1860), 11 Wis. 14; Sedgwick on Stat. & Const. Law, 94, 118;
Potter's Dwarris on Stat. 169. The same rule governs both'
National aid State Courts, in regard to all public Acts of Con-
gress, or which are declared to be such: Morris v. Davidson
(1873), 49 Ga. 861; Canal Co. v. Railroad Co. (1832), 4 G.
& J. (Md.) 63; Kessel v. Albetis (1870), 56 Barb. (T. Y.) 362;
Mimms v. Schwartz (1873), 37 Tex. 13; Bird v. Commonwealth
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(1871), 21 Grat. (Va.) 800; Bayly's Adrn'rs v. Chubb (1862),
16 Id. 284; The Scotia (1871), 14 Wall. (81 U. S.) 171.
In like manner the United States Circuit Courts take notice
of State laws applying tp cases depending before them: .Mer-
rill v. Dawson (1848), 1 Hemp. U. S. C. C. 563 ; Jones v. h-fays
(1849), 4 McLean, U. S. C. C. 521; Jasper v. Porter (1841),
2 Id. 579.
The doctrine is well settled in the Supreme Court of the
United States, that the laws of the several States form a ho-
mogeneous system of domestic jurisprudence, which, under
the judicial powers conferred on the government by the Con-
stitution, the national tribunals are bound to take judicial
notice of and administer alike in all the States, whenever
their jurisdiction of the same is properly invoked: Carpenter
v. Dexter (1869), 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 513; Fourth Nat. Bank v.
_Franlyn (1887), 120 U. S. 747; United States v. Turner
(1850), 11 How. (52 U. S.) 663; Miller v. AleQuerry (1853),
5" McLean, U. S. C. C. 469.
As falling within the same rule, not only the laws, but the
judicial decisions in the several States, will be so noticed ; and
while the judicial knowledge of the Federal Courts extends
at all times to the laws and jurisprudence of all the States,
as a general rule these Courts will follow the construction
placed upon a statute of a State by its Court of last resort:
Hinde v. Vattier (1831), 5 Pet. (30 U. S.) 398; Pennington
v. Gibson (1853), 16 How. (57 U. S.) 65, 81 ; Elmendorfv. Tay-
lor (1825), 10 Wheat. (23 U. S.) 152.
Following the same principle, it is held, that where judg-
ments of a State Court, by reason of their affecting a right
under the Federal Constitution and legislation, would be re-
versible in the Supreme Court of the United States, the State
Courts will take judicial notice of such laws of other States
as the United States Court would notice on appeal; and this
is placed upon the very sufficient ground that it would be a
discordant practice for the Court of original jurisdiction to
adopt a different rule of decision from the one held by the
Court of last resort: State of Ohio v. Rinchman (1856), 27 Pa.
479; Jarvis v. Robinson (1867), 21 Wis. 523; Butcher v.
Brownsville (1863), 2 Kan. 70; Paine v. Schenectady (1876),
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11 R. I. 411; Shotwell v. Harrison (1871), 22 Mich. 410;
Saltar v. 4lpplegate (1851), 23i1N. J. L. 115. And even where
an Act of Congress relates exclusively to the District of Co-
lumbia, it will be judicially noticed by the Courts of the sev-
eral States: Bayly's Adm'rs v. Chubb, supra. So, Acts of
Congress confirming foreign laws, such as grants of lands in
Missouri and other States, whose territory has been ac-
quired by the United States from a foreign power, will be
judicially noticed as public acts: -apin v. Byan (1862), 32
Mo. 21.
IV.
It becomes necessary to determine the character of stat-
utes, which constitutes them public acts, and thus entitled
to judicial notice. It must be conceded that a statute
which is general in its character and equally applicable to
all parts of the State, is a public act. Many State Consti-
tutions contain restrictions upon private or class legislati6n
by requiring that there shall be no special, local, or private
law, in any case for which provision has been or may be made
by general law.
In some of them, this limitation applies in any case where
the relief sought can be given by any State Court. In In-
diana and Oregon, every statute is declared by the Constitu-
tion to be a public law, unless otherwise provided in the
statute itself.
Statutes may be public acts, and yet apply only to certain
localities. It is not necessary that it should extend to all
parts of the State; it is a public act, if it extends equally to
all persons within the territorial limits described in the stat-
ute: Burnham v. Webster (1809), 5 Mass. 266. in accord-
ance with this view, laws upon the following subjects have
been held to be public acts: regulating the sale of liquors
in a particular locality: Levy v. State (1855), 6 Ind. 281;
Inglis v. State (1878), 61 Id. 212; an act to regulate the
lumber trade in a certain district: Pierce v. Kimball (1832),
9 Me. 54; and a statute granting a portion of the public
domain, and affecting the rights of navigation and fishing,
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by allowing improvements to be extended into navigable
waters: Hammond v. Inloes (1853), 4 Md. 138.
The doctrine seems to be fully supported by the authori-
ties, that the character of an Act of the Legislature, whether
it be a general law or not, is determined by the greater or less
extent to which it affects the people, rather than by the ex-
tent of territory over which it operates; therefore a law
affecting a single county, but affecting the rights of all the
people therein, is a general law: State ex rel. Cothren v. Lean
(1859), 9 Wis. 279 ; Clarke v. City of Janesville (1859), 10 Id.
136,195 ; .?ains v. Oshkosh (1861), 14 Id. 372 ; Mills v. Glea-
son (1860), 11 Id. 470.
Some little fluctuation in opinion has resulted in establish-
ing, upon authority, that Courts will judicially notice the
charter or incorporating Act of a municipal corporation, not
only when it is declared to be a public statute, but when it is
public or general in its purposes, though there be no express
provision to that effect: Dillon on Municipal Corp. (3d ed.) sect.
83. This rule rests upon the ground that municipal corpora-
tions are public institutions, created for public purposes. The
municipality is a political subdivision or department of the
State, governed, regulated, and constituted by public law;
the agents who administer its affairs derive their powers
from legislative authority: Payne v. Treadwell (1860), 16 Cal.
220 ; Village of Winooski v. Gokey (1877), 49 Vt. 282 ; Case v.
City of Mobile (1857), 30 Ala. 538; Stier v. Oskaloosa (1875),
41 Iowa, 353 ; Prell v. McDonald (1871), 7 Kan. 426 ; State
v. Sherman (1868), 42 Mo. 210 ; Gallagher v. State (1881), 10
Tex. Ot. App. 469; Alexander v. Milwaukee (1862), 16 Wis.
247; Briggs v. Whipple (1835), 7 Vt. 15; Washington v.
.Fi',Iy (1850), 10 Ark. 423. In like manner, Courts will
noice the repeal of a section of an incorporating Act: Bel-
inuit v. Morrill (1879), 69 Me. 314.
Where the existence of an Act, incorporating a town, had
been previously recognized by the Supreme Court of the then
Territory, the same Court for the State, long afterward, took
judicial cognizance of the legality of the corporation, even
though the Act itself could not be found: Swan v. Comstock
(1864), 18 Wis. 463. Under the rule as stated, for the Court
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to notice a special charter, is to recognize the corporation, but,
when the town or city is organized under the general law, its
incorporation must be proved, for, though the Court will take
notice of the- law, it cannot know that its provisions as to
organizing under it have been complied with: Ward v. City
of Decorah (1876), 43 Iowa, 313. In the same direction, it was
decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana, that while it
would take judicial notice of all the laws authorizing the
formation of plank-road companies, it could not know under
which one of them a particular company was organized:
.Danv!ill, etc. Co. v. State (1861), 16 Ind. 456. The same
Court refused judicial notice of the names of the townships
in a county, because they were established by the commis-
sioners and not by public law: Bragg v. Rush County (1870),
34 Ind. 405. While this objection may be sufficient in the
appellate tribunal, it could not apply in any Court of general
jurisdiction, sitting within the county, where the fact would
appear of record. It has been held, however, that evidence
in the record that a municipality has exercised its corporate
powers under a general law, will sustain the Court in taking
judicial notice of its organization under the same: -Doyle v.
Bradford (1878), 90 IlL 416; following Brush "v. Lemma
(1875), 77 Id. 496.
V.
Acts of the Legislature incorporating banks have gen-
erally been judicially recognized as public statutes or general
laws: Buell v. Warner (1861), 33 Vt. 570. Where the bank
partakes of the character of a State institution, the Courts will
take judicial notice of the fact of its existence, anid that its
notes constitute a circulating medium and are of value: Shaw
v. State (1855), 3 Sneed (Tenn.), 86. Whenever any question
as to the incorporation of a bank arises collaterally, Courts
will take judicial knowledge of its existence and corporate
powers: Hays v. Northwestern Bank (1852), 9 Grat. (Va.)
127; United States v. Amedy (1826), 11 Wheat. (24 U. S.)
392 ; The People v. Hughes (1865), 29 Cal. 258 ; -Davis v. Bank
of Fulton (1860), 31 Ga. 69 ; Cowan v. State (1887), 22 N~eb.
519.
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General laws, incorporating railroad companies, are judici-
ally noticed, the same as other public acts; or, if the charter
be private in form, but is declared by the Legislature to be a
public statute; and it has been held that publication with
other enactments of a public character, will entitle such acts
to judicial notice: Hill v. Brown (1877), 58 N. H. 93; Atchi-
son, etc. R. B. Co. v. Blackshire (1872), 10 Kan. 477; Perry v.
.New Orleans, etc. B. B. Co. (1876), 55 Ala. 413 ; Ohio, etc. B.
B. Co. v. Ridge (1839), 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 78. The following
acts have been declared by the Courts to be public laws, and
thus entitled to judicial recognition: the general law relating
to highways: Griswold v. Gallop (1852), 22 Conn. 208;
acts defining the boundaries of counties: Boss v. Beddick
(1832), 2 Ill. 73; a joint resolution, imposing a particular
duty upon an officer of the State: State v. Delesdenier (1851),
7 Tex. 76. Acts of a State Legislature, or of Congress, called
for, recognized, or adopted by public laws of any State, will
be judicially noticed by the Courts of such State: (anal Co.
v. Railroad Co., supra; and where a public act expressly
amends a private act, the existence and duties of an office
provided for in the latter, will be judicially recognized:
Lavalle v. People (1880), 6 Bradw. (Ill.) 157.
The rule is well settled that statutes which are declared by
the Legislature, at the time of their enactment, to be public
acts, will be judicially noticed by the Courts: Hammett v.
Little Rock R. R. Co. (1859), 20 Ark. 204; Eel River Drain.
Ass'n v. Topp (1861), 16 Ind. 242; Covington Drawbridge Co.
v. Shepherd (1857), 20 How. (61 U. S.), 227; Beaty v. Knowles
(1830), 4 Pet. (29 U. S.), 152. The same rule prevails when
Courts are required by the Legislature to notice private
statutes: Bixler's Admr's v. Parker (1867), 3 Bush (Ky.), 166 ;
Halbirt v. Skyles (1818), 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.), 368; Hart v.
Baltimore, etc. B. B. Co. (1873), 6 W. Va. 336; Collier v.
Baptist Society (1847-8), 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 68; Somerville v.
Winbish (1850), 7 Grat. (Va.) 205.
VL
As to how far the Courts will go in taking judicial cog-
nizance of the correct reading of a statute, or whether in its
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enactment all constitutional requirements affecting its valid-
ity have been complied with, the authorities are not entirely
uniform. On the one hand it is held, with strong support,
that "Courts are bound judicially to take notice of what the
law is, and to enable them to determine whether all the con-
stitutional requisites to the validity of a statute have been
complied with, it is their right, as well as duty, to take notice
of the journals of the Legislature, and no plea is necessary to
bring to the notice of the Court facts which the Court must
judicially know, and in respect to which no proof can be
given:" People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney (1865), 13 Mich. 481;
Coburn v. Dodd (1860), 14 Ind. 347; Board of Supervisors v.
Heenan (1858), 2 Minn. 830; People v. Purdy (1841), 2 Hill
(N. Y.), 31; De Bow v. -People (1845), 1 Denio (N. Y.), .9;
People v. River Raisii, etc. B. B. Co. (1864), 12 Mich. 389;
Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Sparrow (1846), 2 Denio (N.
Y.), 97.
On the other hand, in -llinois Central B. B. Co. v. Wren
(1867), 43 I1. 77, and Bedard v. Ball (1867), 44 Id. 91, the
Supreme Court of that State holds that judicial notice cannot
be taken of the journals of the Legislature upon this question;
while in the case of the Pqcfc A. R. Co. v. Governor (1856),
23 Mo. 353, and the following cases cited, these Courts seem
to sustain the view that the certificates of the presiding
officers of the two houses of the Legislature are, officially, of
equal or superior weight with the journals themselves: Dun-
combe v. P'ndle (1861), 12 Iowa, 1; Green v. Wller (1856),
32 Miss. 650; Fouke v. Fleming (1858), 13 Md. 392; People v.
Devlin (1865), 33 N. Y. 269; Pangborn v. Young (1866), 32
N. J. L. 29 ; Root v. King (1827), 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 613 ; Ki-
bourne v. Thompson (1880), 103 U. S. 168 ; Chicago & A. .R. .
Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co. (1887), 119 Id. 615.
On this point, in a recent and somewhat well-considered
opinion, which is sustained by numerous citations, the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska held that" the-certificate of the pre-
siding officer of a branch of the Legislature that a bill has duly
passed the house over which he presides, is merely prima facie
evidence of the fact, and evidence may be received to ascer-
tain whether or not the bill actually passed. The journals of
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the respective houses are records of the proceedings therein,
and if it should appear from them that a bill bad not actually
passed, the presumption in favor of the certificate would be
overthrown and the Act declared invalid :" Stale ex rel. Huff
v. McLelland (1885), 18 Neb. 236; Clare v. State (1857), 5
Iowa, 509; Evans v. Broume (1869), 30 Ind. 514; Madison
Co. Com'rs v. Burford (1883), 93 Id. 383.
In Gardner v. Collector (1867), 6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 499, the
Supreme Court of the United States adheres to substantially
the same rule which, with the additional support of the fol-
lowing decisions, would seem to carry the weight of authority
decidedly in favor of this view of the matter: Legg v. 3Mayor
(1874), 42 Md. 203; Berry v. Drum Point B. B. (1874), 41
Id.. 446; Moody v. State (1872), 48 Ala. 115; People v. De
Wolf (1871), 62 Ill. 253; State v. City of Hastings (1877), 24
Minn. 78; Southwick Bank v. Commonwealth (1856), 26 Pa.
446; Jones v. Hutchinson (1868), 43 Ala. 721; .Fowler v. Pierce
(1852), 2 Cal. 165; Speer v. Plank Boad Co. (1853), 22 Pa.
376; Opinion of the Justices (1864), 45 N. I. 607; Opinion of
the Justices (1858), 35 Id. 579 ; Opinion of the Justices (1873),
52 Id. 622; Coleman v. Dobbins (1856), 8 Ind. 156.
VII.
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the State, in
opposition to which any other law, or any direction or order,
must be inoperative and void. If, therefore, such other law,
direction, or order, seems to be applicable to the facts, but on
comparison with the fundamental law, the latter is found to
be in conflict with it, the Court, in declaring what the law of
the case is, must necessarily fletermine its invalidity, and
thereby effectually annul it: De Chastellux v. Fairchild (1850),
15 Pa. 18.
The Courts take judicial notice of all constitutional amend-
ments, and when the same went into force: Graves v. Keaton
(1866), 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 8.
Judicial notice is taken of the common law, as the basis of
our system of jurisprudence. It is recognized as a system of
grand principles, founded on the mature and perfected reason
of centuries, that have grown up irrespective of statutes, and
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which, no matter how recently announced, are assumed to
have existed from time immemorial; and in the administra-
tion of justice as embodying the rules upon which remedies
are given in a vast majority of cases: Wilson v. Bumstead
(1881), 12 Neb. 1.
For these reasons, Courts will not hesitate to apply the
common law to any condition of facts, however novel this
application may seem; for it would have but little claim to
the admiration to which it is entitled, if it failed to adapt
itself to any condition, however new, which may arise; and
it would be singularly lame, if it were impotent to determine
the right of any dispute whatsoever: Conger v. Weaver (1856),
6 Cal. 548.
A treaty is the supreme law of the land by which judges
in every State must be bound, and no Act of the Legislature
can stand in its way: Hauenstein v. Lynham (1879), 10 Otto
(100 U. S.) 483. So far as the power of the contracting par-
ties is concerned, a treaty with an Indian tribe is like a treaty
with a foreign power, and equally as binding as a law of Con-
gress: U. S. v. Payne (1881), 2 M'Crary (U. S. C. C. W.
Dist. Ark.), 289; Wilson v. Wall (1867), 6 Wall. (73 U. S.)
83; Dole v. Wilson (1871), 16 Minn. 525; U. 1S. v. 1eynes
(1850), 9 How. (50 U. S.) 127. Courts are also required to
notice extradition treaties; and where, in an action for slander
in a State Court, the crime alleged to have been falsely
charged was, that the plaintiff had committed a murder in
Ireland, the Court took judicial notice that Ireland is within
the jurisdiction of the British Empire, and that murder is a
crime for which, under the extradition treaty with that Em-
pire, the party was liable to b5e reclaimed and delivered up by
the United States government for punishment: Montgomery v.
-Deeley (1854), 3 Wis. 709.
Public institutions, such as court-houses, jails, prisons, asy-
lums, State universities, and the like, are entitled to judicial
notice, not only from their public character and well-known
situations, but as being established by law. The universi-
ties of Oxford and Cambridge, and that they were founded
for the promotion of learning and religion, are taken notice
of by the Courts in. England, and no reason seems to exist
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why many similar institutions in this country should not fall
within the same rule: Oxford Poor Rate (1857), 8 E & B.
184-211.
VIII.
Judicial notice of foreign laws is not taken by the Courts
of this country; and a claim or defence founded on a foreign
law, must be alleged and proved; otherwise, the presumption
is that the foreign law is the same as that of the forum:
Syiae v. Stewart (1865), 17 La. An. 73; Chumusaro v. Gilbert
(1860), 24 Ill. 293; Frith v. Sprague (1817), 14 Mass. 455;
Baptiste v. De Volunbrun (1820), 5 II. & J. (Md.) 86 ; Iooper
v. Noore (1857), 5 Jones (N. C.) Law, 130 ; Woodrow v. O'Con-
nor (1856), 28 Vt. 776; Bean v. Briggs (1857), 4 Iowa, 464;
Hilliard v. Outlaw (1885), 92 N. C. 266 ; Sloan v. Torry (1883),
78 Mo. 623 ; Owen v. Boyle (1838), 15 Me. 147. The common
or unwritten law of a foreign country and the construction
given to a foreign statute, by usage and judicial decisions,
which thus becomes a part of the unwritten law, must be
proved by the testimony of experts: Dyer v. Smith (1837),
12 Conn. 384. Of a printed volume, purporting to contain the
statutes of a foreign country, being received to prove them, it
may perhaps be safely said that some extrinsic evidence of
its authenticity will generally be required.
As a general rule the laws of one State will not be judi-
cially noticed by the Courts of another State. Their relation
to each other in the Union is that of foieign States in close
friendship, and the rules for the proof of foreign laws are
relaxed as to the statutes of sister States ; a printed volume,
assuming to contain them and published by the State authority,
will be received in all cases as primafaie evidence to estab-
lish what are the laws of any particular State: Irving v. Mc-
Lean (1835), 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 52 ; Cook v. Wilson (1821), Litt.
Sel. Ca. (Ky.) 437; Ripple v. Ripple (1829), 1 Rawle (Pa.),
386; Sims v. Southern -Express Co. (1868), 38 Ga. 129; Hoyt
v. Ne]eil (1868), 13 Minn. 390; Rape v. Heaton (1859), 9
Wis. 328; Drake v. Glover (1857), 30 Ala. 382; Anderson v.
Anderson (1859), 23 Tex. 639; Carey v. Cincinnati, etc. B. 1.
Co. (1857), 5 Iowa, 357; W itesides v. Poole (1855), 9 Rich.
208 MATTERS REQUIRING JUDICIAL NOTICE.
(S. C.) 68; Taylor v. .Boardman (1853), 25 Vt. 581; Nexton
v. Cooke (1849), 10 Ark. 169; Miller v. Avery (1848), 2 Barb.
(N. Y.) Ch. 582; Anderson v..Folger (1856), 11 La. An. 269;
De Sobry v. De Laistre (1807), 2 H. & J. (Md.) 191; Mason v.
Wash (1822), 1 Ill. 16; Boggs v. -Reed (1819), 5 Mart. (La.)
673.
Where a new State has been erected from an older one, or
the territory composing a State formerly belonged to a for-
eign power, an exception is made as to foreign laws; those
in force before the separation or acquirement of the territory
by the United States, are judicially noticed by the Courts
within the States thus formed. Accordingly, the Supreme
C6urts of Louisiana and Missouri, and the Supreme Court
of the United States, take judicial notice of the Spanish laws
prevailing in the then territory of Louisiana, before the ces-
sion to the United States: Pequet v. Pequet (1865), 17 La.
An. 204; Choteau v. Pierre (1845), 9 Mo. 3; Ott v. Soulard
(1846), Id. 581; U. S. v. Trner (1850), 11 How. (52 U. S.)
663. And the same is true of the laws in force in California
and the Territories acquired from Mexico: Payne v. Tread-
well (1860), 16 Cal. 220; Bouldin v. Phelps (U. S. C. C. N.
Dist. Cal. 1887), 80 Fed. Rep. 547. For the reason stated the
Supreme Courts of Indiana and Kentucky recognize certain
statutes of the State of Virginia: HYenthorn v. Doe (1822), 1
Blackf. (Ind.) 15t ; Delano v. "o.pling (1822),1 Littell (Ky.),117,
417. In Tennessee, certain statutes of North Carolina: Ste-
vens v. Bomar (1848), 9 Hu mph. (Tenn.) 546; Green v. Goodall
(1860), 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 404; Wilson v. Smith (1825), 5 Yerg.
(Tenn.) 879. On the proof of a foreign law, by the parol tes-
timony of experts the jury must determine the existence of,
and what that law is, but the question of its construction and
effect is for the Court alone: Kline v. Baker (1868), 99 Mass.
253; Holman v. King (1844), 7 Met. (Mass.) 384; Story's
Conflict of Laws, § 638; Pickard v. Bailey (1852), 26 N. H.
152. Where on its face a contract or other matter in dispute
is to be governed by a foreign law, and no proof of the law is
made, and it is not such as to be judicially noticed, the adjudi-
cating tribunal will proceed upon the basis of its own laws,
not being informed in what respect the foreign law differs;
MATTERS REQUIRING JUDICIAL NOTICE.
or presuming, within certain restrictions, that it is identical.
Thus, as a general rule, it is presumed that the common law
prevails in each of the United States: Monroe v. Douglass
(1851), 5 Ni. Y. 447; Whitford v. Panama Railroad Co. (1861),
23 Id. 465; Copley v. Sandford (1847), 2 La. An. 835; Rape
v. Heaton, supra; Whart. on Ev., § 314; and that the
common law is similarly in force in each State: Wilson v.
Cockrell (1843), 8 Mo. 1; Houghtaling v. Ball (1853), 19 Id.
84; Billingsly v. Dean (1858), 11 Ind. 331.
Champerty, being an offence at common law, it is pre-
sumed, the contrary not appearing, to be against the law of
another State: Thurston v. Percival (1823), 1 Pick. (Mass.)
415. As in Massachusetts, the giving of a promissory note is
evidence of the payment of a pre-existing debt, the law will
be presumed the same in Maine: -ly v. James (1877), 123
Mass. 36. If a contract made with reference to foreign laws
and to be governed thereby, would be void or illegal by the
law of the forum, the Court will not, for the mere purpose of
defeating the contract, presume the foreign law to be the
same; on the contrary, in the absence of proof, it will un-
derstand the contract to be valid by the foreign law: Bishop
on Mar. & Div., § 412; Whart. on Ev., §§ 314, 1250; Jones
v. Palmer (1844), 1 Doug. (Mich.) 379. Where the defence is
usury, and the contract would be usurious under the domestic
law, the Court will not presume the lex loci contractus is iden-
tical and so overthrow the contract: for the burden of prov-
ing the foreign law is on the defendant to establish his
defence: .Charnpion, v. Kille (1863), 15 N. J. Eq. 476; Cutler
v. Wright (1860), 22 N. Y. 472; Davis v. Bowling (1854), 19
Mo. 651.
E. W. METCALFE.
Lincoln, Neb.
(To be continued.)
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